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RESPONDENTS HAVE FAILED TO RESPOND TO ANY OF PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL 
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES AND SUCH FAILURE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS 
AN ADMISSION THAT THE ARGUMENTS ARE VALID AND COMPELLING, 
Respondent's brief is startling in that it does not in any way 
attempt to respond to the legal theories and authorities contained 
in Plaintiff's brief. None of the cases cited and argued by 
Plaintiff as controlling authority are so much as even discussed by 
Respondent. 
The only logical conclusion which can be drawn from this 
omission is that Respondents either agree with, or have no valid 
and articuable legal response to, Plaintiff's arguments and 
authorities. Such a conclusion not only has the force of logic but 
of law as well. The Nevada Supreme Court in the case of Bates v. 
Chronister. 100 Nev. 675, 691 P.2d 865, (1984) held that the 
"Failure to respond to arguments in brief is deemed as a confession 
of error on appeal." Id. at 870. 
This Court should consider conceded by the Respondents that 
Plaintiff is correct in his second point that "The Industrial 
Commission erred in failing to either consider or hold a hearing 
regarding the conflicting medical opinions which clearly indicate 
that the agency misconstrued the opinions of certain physicians in 
rendering its final agency action." 
The September 17, 1990 letter from Dr. Robert H. Burgoyne (R. 
Vol. Ill at 44) as well as the October 3, 1990 letter from Dr. Jack 
L. Tedrow (R. Vol. Ill at 45) were not available at the time of 
1 
Plaintiff's first hearing in 1987. The Industrial Commission 
subsequently failed to set a formal hearing or review this 
important evidence. The Industrial Commission, based upon those 
two medical opinions, should have reviewed the record for the 
purpose of taking oral testimony from both physicians to consider 
their opinions for the purpose of determining whether in fact, as 
the Doctors in their letters strongly infer, the Industrial 
Commission erred in concluding that there was no causal connection 
between Mr. Cummins' 1984 industrial accident and his subsequent 
inability to return to work. 
Respondents apparently also concede the other stated basis for 
remand, namely, that Plaintiff has never received an evidentiary 
hearing on his application for permanent total disability benefits. 
The Administrative Law Judge's allegation that the parties "waived 
an evidentiary hearing" (R. Vol. I at 288-90) has, as Plaintiff 
points out in his brief, no support in the record. Respondents in 
their brief do not even suggest that this Court can find that the 
hearing was waived. It should be taken as established as Mr. 
Cummins forcefully argued in his original brief that the 
"Stipulation for Submission to Medical Panel" contained in Vol. I, 
page 263 of the Record was solely "....for the purpose of 
submitting this matter to a medical panel..." and not for the 
purpose of waiving any evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
disability issues. 
Mr. Cummins' subsequent attempts to obtain a hearing have 
either been stayed or not ruled on by the Industrial Commission. 
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The Order sought to be reviewed here was entered without benefit of 
oral testimony or cross-examination. Mr. Cummins is entitled to 
his "day in court" and the opportunity to present all evidence in 
support of his claim for lifetime total disability benefits. 
This case should be remanded to the Industrial Commission to 
admit for further consideration and review, the medical opinions of 
Dr. Tedrow and Dr. Burgoyne, as well as that of Dr. Lewis G. 
Moench, relative to the medical causes of the Plaintiff's 
permanent, total disability status. 
As Respondents have not contested nor rebutted this issue in 
their brief, their assent should be presumed and they should be 
estopped from arguing the point at oral argument. Kinney v. 
Vaccari, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 27 C.3d 348, 612 P.2d 876 (Cal. 1980). 
II 
THE STATEMENT OF FACT8 CONTAINED IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IS HIGHLY 
SELECTIVE, ARGUMENTATIVE AND MISSTATES THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
The vast bulk of Respondent's brief does not address legal 
issues but rather is a highly selective, often irrelevant and 
argumentative version of the facts in this matter. Contrary to the 
allegations in the opening paragraphs of Respondent's Statement of 
Facts, their review of the "Appellants medical, social and legal 
history both prior to and after the industrial accident" is not 
essential to an understanding of the issue to be decided by this 
Court. Respondent's Statement of the Facts, when viewed 
objectively, can only be considered as an attempt to confuse the 
issues and mislead the Court. 
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Much of Respondent's alleged Statement of Fact contains 
irrelevant and argumentative interpretations of the record. 
Illustrative are the references to Plaintiff's mother's nervous 
breakdown, an alleged discrepancy in the length of Plaintiff's 
military service, elaboration on the reason for his discharge and 
long and detailed references to his alleged "drug seeking 
behavior." Respondents devote much space to these tiltillating 
details but do not use them to support any legal theory. They are 
not offered to impeach Plaintiff's credibility and do not do so in 
any event. Their purpose seems to be to prejudice the Court. As 
such, much of Respondent's allegations in this section are subject 
to being stricken by the Court pursuant to Rule 24(k) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure for containing "irrelevant, immaterial 
or scandalous matters." 
When Respondents do address relevant matters of fact contained 
in the record, they do so in a most cursory, selective and self-
serving manner. Respondent's devote only two sentences to 
describing how the industrial accident occurred. Respondent's 
account on page 7 of their brief, does not cite the record at all 
and misstates the facts, getting the sequence of events wrong. 
This is done in an apparent attempt to somehow create an impression 
of wrongdoing or negligence by Plaintiff. 
In actuality, the true facts are contained in R. Vol. Ill at 
15-16 and are that on August 23, 1984, while at a customer's home 
to deliver several appliances for his employer, Mr. Cummins placed 
a dryer on a dollie and while walking backward up some stairs, 
4 
pulling the dollie after him, one of the stairs split and broke. 
He fell backward and struck his lower back on the edge of the 
steps. This version of the facts was adopted by the Administrative 
Law Judge (R. Vol. I at 34) and should be considered controlling. 
It is markedly different than Respondents' version which has no 
basis in the record or reality. 
In quoting from the record, Respondents further resort to 
heavy editing, and the deletion of inconvenient facts which 
conflict with the Respondents' desired view of the facts. 
Illustrative is Respondents' attempt to argue that Plaintiff's own 
experts do not support his physical disabled status. On page 16 of 
their brief, Respondents quote a letter dated March 13, 1989 from 
Dr. Michael James of South Valley Mental Health for the proposition 
that Plaintiff is not disabled. Respondents, however, conveniently 
deleted the following sentence from the passage they quote: "I 
would appreciate it if you would not suggest to your client that I 
am in a position to comment on his (Plaintiff's) physical 
impairment. That judgment is in the hands of other consultants." 
(R. Vol. I at 249). The deliberate deletion of this passage from 
the portion quoted by Respondents in their brief gives a false and 
misleading impression of Dr. James' opinion about this matter. 
Given the significance of the deletion, it should not be considered 
inadvertent. 
Likewise, the citation to the record for Dr. Tedrow on pages 
16 and 17 of Respondents' brief is inaccurate as the quoted 
passages do not appear where they are cited, if at all. 
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Respondents' attempt to argue that Dr. Tedrow believed that Mr. 
Cummins' entire disability was psychiatric and that therapy would 
return him to work. In fact, Dr. Tedrow's April 17, 1989 report 
provides as follows: "His psychiatric impairment has been rated at 
15% impairment of the whole man and I would concur with this 
rating. The orthopedic (disc) problem has been rated additionally 
at 10% and as the cause of his chronic pain syndrome. As far as 
pre-existence is concerned, obviously the orthopedic problem did 
not. ..." (R. Vol. I at 249-253). Dr. Tedrow clearly attributed 
at least 10% of Plaintiff's disability to his industrial injury. 
Finally and most appalling, Respondents baldly allege on page 
18 of their brief that "All of the doctors who have evaluated Mr. 
Cummins agree that the back injury is relatively minor and would 
not result in a finding of permanent total disability by itself. 
(R. Vol. I at 9, 21, 246-259, 279, 334-335, 338-340, 343, 361-
362)." Not only is that statement demonstrably false, not one of 
the portions of the record cited actually support the allegation 
made. 
Similarly, a review of the record citations is enlightening. 
Vol. I, page 9 of the record is the Medical Panel Report and while 
it finds that Plaintiff was not temporarily totally disabled, it 
does find that he does suffer from a permanent, partial disability 
as a result of the industrial accident. Page 21 is a psychiatric 
assessment by Dr. Louis G. Moench who does not comment at all on 
Plaintiff's back injury. Page 246 is a Social Security 
Administration "Explanation of Determination" which reflects the 
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Social Security Administration's belief, at that time, that his 
injury would confine him to light work. It is not a doctor's 
report. Page 247 is a psychiatric assessment by Dr. Tedrow which 
does not deal at all with Plaintiff's back injury. Page 248 is a 
report from Dr. James indicating that "I am unable to comment on 
his [chronic back instability] since I was consulted for 
psychiatric concerns." Page 249 is another report form Dr. James 
indicating that disability due to back injuries is a "judgment in 
hands of other consultants." Pages 250-252 contain an April 17, 
1989 report from Dr. Tedrow indicating that the orthopedic problems 
are responsible for 10% of Mr. Cummins' disability. Page 253 is 
another Dr. Tedrow "Brief Medical Report" which again attributes 
disability in part to a "degenerative disk disease." Page 254 is 
a September 5, 1989 report from Dr. Tedrow which is silent about 
back injuries. Pages 255-59 contain a report from Dr. Soderberg 
which does not comment on the degree of disability attributable to 
the accident. Pages 279, 334, 338-340, 343 and 361-362 are more 
Social Security "Explanations of Determinations", which again are 
not doctor reports, and deal primarily with the psychological 
disability and do not comment in any detail on Mr. Cummins' back 
injury. 
Respondent's clumsy attempt to allege support from the record 
that Plaintiff's back injury is minor and not sufficient for 
permanent total disability is reprehensible. In fact, the vast 
majority of the medical evidence supports a finding that 
Plaintiff's back injury is significant does warrant a finding to 
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permanent, total disability. That evidence was marshalled with 
accurate citations to the record on pages 17 through 21 of 
Plaintiff's original brief. As Respondents have not even attempted 
to respond to that significant evidence, it need not be restated 
here. 
The plain fact is that the Industrial Commission erred in failing 
to find the Plaintiff was entitled to permanent, total disability 
since all parties concede that he is unable to work; and that the 
industrial accident was an aggravating and precipitating cause of 
his permanent, total disability. 
While parties to a lawsuit often disagree as to the 
interpretation to be given certain facts, this is not a case of 
simple disagreement as to relative interpretation of facts. 
Respondents have inundated their Statement of Facts with 
irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial allegations. They have made 
baseless allegations under the pretense of citing facts, sometime 
with no reference to the record. When the record is cited to 
support sweeping generalizations, it has been mischaracterized as 
demonstrated above. 
"The rules of appellate procedures require that parties cite 
to the record when factual assertions are made... It is improper 
to make blanket assertions of fact and leave it to this Court to 
ferret out evidence from the record to support those assertions." 
Golden Key Realty Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985). 
"The Supreme Court need not, and will not consider any facts not 
properly cited to or supported by the record." Uckerman v. Lincoln 
8 
National Life Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). 
Ill 
THE DOCTRINE OF MITIGATION OF DAMAGE8 HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS 
CASE AS IT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS. OR THE LAW AND IS RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Respondents quote American Smelting & Refining Co, v. 
Industrial Commission, 290 P. 770, 771 (Utah 1930) for the 
proposition that "when a disability can be prevented or removed by 
a minor and safe operation, or by safe medical treatment, then it 
is the duty of the injured employee to submit to such operation or 
treatment•..." 
Respondents allege in their opening paragraph that "The 
Supreme Court of Utah has long held..." this principle. It would 
be more accurate to say that the Supreme Court long ago held as 
such. This is the only Utah case cited by Respondents in their 
entire brief and it is over 60 years old, having originally been 
decided in 1930. In the intervening 60 years the Utah Supreme 
Court has not had occasion to so hold again or even to cite that 
case as controlling precedent. While perhaps not having been 
overruled, it is sharply limited to its own facts and has been 
effectively relegated to the dust bin of Utah legal precedent. 
Even if it is of some relevance, the case is easily 
distinguished. American Smelting & Refining involved the 
extraordinary fact situation where the injured employee lacerated 
and fractured his fingers. The employee allowed the injury to be 
dressed but refused to allow the fracture to be set or "reduced." 
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A severe infection set in eventually resulting in the loss of a 
finger and considerable loss of function of the left hand at the 
wrist. The Industrial Commission had made a specific finding that 
the finger could have been saved if the worker had submitted to 
needed treatment. The Supreme Court on appeal specifically found 
that "There is evidence to support the findings of the 
Commission...." Id at 771. 
In this case, there is no finding bv the Industrial Commission 
that Mr. Cummins ever wilfully refused medical treatment which 
aggravated his current medical condition. Respondent's argument 
which, as noted below, is raised for the first time on appeal, was 
not considered by the Administrative Law Judge or the Industrial 
Commission on review and is not supported by any of the treating or 
examining doctors. 
This highly creative argument is the sole construction of 
Respondents' counsel and has absolutely no medical support in the 
record. Respondents premise their argument upon the statements of 
Dr. Martin on September 19, 1984 that Mr. Cummins could return to 
work "if the job did not entail any lifting" (R Vol. I at 100) and 
Dr. Soderberg's comment of September 18, 1985 that surgery would 
get him "back to work within the next four to six months" (R. Vol. 
I at 51). Respondents' error is that these statements were only a 
speculation of what might occur in the future, after surgery, and 
were not definite statements of present medical and physical fact 
by the doctors. 
None of the doctors in this case, including those serving on 
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the Medical Panel, has ever found that Mr. Cummins aggravated or 
failed to mitigate his injuries. There is not a single reference 
in the record or even a finding by the Administrative Law Judge or 
the Industrial Commission that his present condition is in any way 
connected to his reluctance to submit to surgery. 
This Court has previously held that "(The Court of Appeals) 
will not consider conclusory arguments without citation to either 
the record or cases involving the pivotal issue." Marchant v. Park 
City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Respondents also cite the case of Nelson v. EBI Companies, 666 
P.2d 1360 (Oregon 1983) as additional support of their mitigation 
argument. That case, however, is easily distinguishable and is 
further not even on point. Respondents cite it as precedent for 
the proposition that Plaintiff should be denied benefits due to his 
failure to submit to a surgical procedure. Nelson, however, was 
not a surgical case and the Court acknowledged that it had adopted 
a different result in cases involving surgical procedures. That 
Court also took specific notice of its prior decision in demons v. 
Rosebura Lumber Co., 34 Or. App. 135, 578 P.2d 429, 431 (Oregon. 
App. 1978) where it held that "the claimant was not required to 
submit to a recommended surgical procedure." 
Such a result is in line with the general proposition that 
"Courts are reluctant to require injured litigants to submit to 
surgery." Livaccari v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 118 So.2d 
275, 280 (La. App. 1960) . This is especially true in cases of back 
surgery. For example in Beth-Elkhorn v. Eplinq, 450 S.W.2d 814 (Ky 
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1967), a refusal to undergo a laminectomy was held to be reasonable 
as a matter of law, even though the medical testimony was 
uncontroverted and indicated a high probability of success with 
little risk. 
The burden is on the employer to establish an unjustified 
refusal to consent to reasonable and necessary medical evidence. 
Henderson v. Booth, 281 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1973), Texas-Oklahoma 
Express v. Best, 576 P.2d 1177 (Okla. 1978). Respondents have not 
even come close to meeting that burden, but rely solely on 
conjecture and innuendo. 
Although Respondents on page 22 of their brief cite Professor 
Larson's authoritative treatise on Workman's Compensation Law, 
their citation is incomplete and does not accurately reference the 
current unabridged edition of the treatise, nor for that matter, is 
the treatise even supportive of Respondent's position. 
The most current edition of Professor Larson's treatise 
contains this statement: 
But is there is a real risk involved, and particularly if 
there is a considerable chance that the operation will 
result in no improvement or even perhaps in a worsening 
of the condition, the claimant cannot be forced to run 
the risk at peril of losing his statutory compensation 
rights. In such cases, and particularly in the commonest 
operations presenting this problem - hernia and 
interverteybral disc - most courts will not at present 
disturb a finding that refusal to submit to the operation 
is reasonable, since the question is a complex fact 
judgment involving a multitude of variables, including 
claimant's age and physical condition and his previous 
surgical experience, the ratio of deaths from the 
operation, the percentage of cures and many oth€>rs. The 
matter cannot be determined automatically as a matter of 
medical statistics and expert testimony, the surgeon who 
sees several operations every day and who testifies that 
the chance of fatality is only five percent naturally has 
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a different point of view than the claimant who has never 
had a major operation and might quite understandably 
prefer to enjoy life as best he can with his injury 
rather than take a one-in-twenty chance of being dead. 
In the words of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 
Steelmen v. Justice, 227 P2.d 647 (Okla. 1951): 
The State Industrial Commission is without 
jurisdiction to order the employee to submit to a 
major operation involving a risk of life, however 
slight, merely in order that the pecuniary 
obligations created by the law in his favor against 
his employer may be minimized. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, Section 13.22(f) 
(June 1991). 
Respondents' argument is also defective in that it is raised 
for the first time on appeal. Few principles of appellate 
procedure and practice are as well established as the principle 
that an Appellate Court will not consider issues raised for the 
first time on appeal. Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Brobery v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Villenuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981). 
Respondents did not raise this argument below, and it is 
neither part of the Administrative Law Judge's Finding and Order, 
nor part of the Industrial Commission's rational in its order 
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Review. Respondents do not cite any 
part of the record below where this argument and the facts to 
support it were ever raised. "The burden is on the parties to make 
certain that the record they compile will adequately preserve their 
arguments for review in event of an appeal11 Onyeabor v. Pro 
Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Respondents have 
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failed in meeting this burden and the issue should not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents in their brief do not address any of the arguments 
and legal authorities cited by Plaintiff which mandated an award of 
permanent, total disability benefits. Given this lack of response, 
the Court should treat their silence as acquiescence and 
"confession of error" below. The record is replete with evidence 
as to the totally disabling injury Plaintiff has suffered 
occasioned by his industrial accident. 
Respondents' characterization of the evidence is shockingly 
biased and grossly mischaracterizes the evidence though selective 
quotations and deletions. Some of the portions of the record 
referenced by Respondent do not, in fact, support the proposition 
for which they are cited. 
Mr. Cummins has not failed to mitigate his injuries and was 
not required to submit to surgical procedures merely to reduce 
Respondents' financial exposure. The failure to mitigate damages 
is (1) not supported by the record; (2) not a basis of the 
Administrative Law Judge's or the Industrial Commission's decision; 
and (3) raised on appeal for the first time. It should be given no 
weight or compelling force. 
Since Respondents do not dispute Plaintiff's legal 
contentions, this Court need not remand but may summarily order the 
awarding of appropriate benefits. Such a ruling is warranted by 
14 
the facts and the law. 
DATED this 7th day of January, 1992. 
Attorney for Pllaint 
v 
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